Abstract-A program obfuscator takes a program and outputs a "scrambled" version of it, where the goal is that the obfuscated program will not reveal much about its structure beyond what is apparent from executing it. There are several ways of formalizing this goal. Specifically, in indistinguishability obfuscation, first defined by Barak et al. (CRYPTO 2001), the requirement is that the results of obfuscating any two functionally equivalent programs (circuits) will be computationally indistinguishable. Recently, a fascinating candidate construction for indistinguishability obfuscation was proposed by Garg et al. (FOCS 2013). This has led to a flurry of discovery of intriguing constructions of primitives and protocols whose existence was not previously known (for instance, fully deniable encryption by Sahai and Waters, STOC 2014). Most of them explicitly rely on additional hardness assumptions, such as oneway functions.
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of program obfuscation is to transform a given program (say described as a boolean circuit) into another "scrambled" circuit which is functionally equivalent by "hiding" its implementation details (making it hard to "reverseengineer"). The theoretical study of obfuscation was initiated by Barak et al. [1] , [2] . They studied several notions of obfuscation, primarily focusing on virtual black-box obfuscation (henceforth VBB). Virtual black-box obfuscation requires that anything that can be efficiently computed from the obfuscated program, can also be computed efficiently from black-box (i.e., input-output) access to the program. Their main result was that this notion of obfuscation cannot be achieved for all circuits. Moreover, the existence of virtual black-box obfuscators for various restricted families of functions is still a major open problem.
As a way to bypass their general impossibility result, Barak et al. [2] introduced the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (henceforth iO). An indistinguishability obfuscator is an algorithm that guarantees that if two circuits compute the same function, then their obfuscations are computationally indistinguishable.
Recently, there have been two significant developments regarding indistinguishability obfuscation: first, candidate constructions for obfuscators for all polynomial-time programs were proposed [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] and second, intriguing applications of iO have been demonstrated, e.g., general-purpose functional encryption scheme [3] , deniable encryption with negligible advantage [9] , two-round secure MPC [10] , traitor-tracing schemes with very short messages [11] , secret-sharing for NP [12] and more. However, essentially all these applications (and others) explicitly rely on some additional hardness assumption (such as one-way functions). 1 This should not come as a surprise: As noted already by Barak et al. [2] , if P = NP, then there are no one-way functions but iO does exist. 2 We consider both "perfect" obfuscators with perfect functionality (i.e., the obfuscator always preserves the functionality of the input circuit) and "imperfect" obfuscators, where the functionality is preserved only with overwhelming probability. Our goal is to deepen our understanding of the relation between several notions of obfuscation and one-way functions. We ask the following question:
Under which assumptions is it redundant to assume one-way functions on top of an efficient and possibly imperfect obfuscator?
Our Main Result: In this paper, we provide an answer to the above question. We show that if NP ⊆ io-BPP and there is an efficient, even imperfect, iO, then one-way functions exist, where io-BPP is the class of languages that can be decided by a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for infinitely many input lengths. 3 In addition, we also provide a completely different proof of a somewhat weaker statement. We first show that the existence of efficient indistinguishability obfuscators for 3CNF formulas implies (unconditionally) the existence of SZKarguments for NP. Then, we use a result of Ostrovsky [15] which states that SKZ-arguments for hard-on-the average languages implies the existence of one-way functions. Thus, we get that the existence of one-way functions can be based on the existence of a hard-on-the average NP-problem and, even imperfect, iO for 3CNFs. This result is weaker than the result above since the existence of hard-on-the average NP-problems implies that NP ⊆ io-BPP (however, it only requires an obfuscator for 3CNF formulas, as opposed to all polynomial-size circuits).
Finally, we generalize a result of [2] and show that even if imperfect VBB obfuscators exist (even for a very simple family of functions such as point functions 4 ), then one-way functions exist. We summarize our results in the following theorem.
Main Theorem. Any of the following three conditions implies that one-way functions exist: 2 If P = NP, then the polynomial hierarchy collapses to P, thus we can efficiently find the lexicographically first circuit that has the same functionality as some given circuit. 3 If we assume efficient and perfect iO, then we give a simple argument that proves that NP ⊆ io-coRP implies one-way functions. See Section II for further details. 4 A Boolean function is a point function if it is the constant 0 function or it assumes the value 1 at exactly one point (and 0 everywhere else).
A corollary of our main theorem is that many applications that assume (even imperfect) iO and one-way functions can be obtained by assuming iO and NP ⊆ io-BPP. Two notable examples are the construction of deniable encryption of Sahai and Waters [9] and the construction of a traitortracing scheme of Boneh and Zhandry [11] . In addition, we view our results as making the claim of Sahai and Waters [9] that iO is a "central hub" of cryptography more cohesive.
Borrowing from Impagliazzo's terminology [16] , if (even imperfect) iO exists, then our result rules out Pessiland, where hard-on-the average languages exist but one-way functions do not. We observe that if NP ⊆ BPP, then oneway functions do not exist but iO does. Therefore, ignoring the issue of infinitely-often input lengths, we can state Item 1 of our main result as follows: NP ⊆ BPP if and only if there exists an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator and one-way functions do not exist.
More Related Work: Subsequently to [2] , Goldwasser and Kalai [17] and Goldwasser and Rothblum [18] introduced other variants of definitions of obfuscation and proved that they are also impossible to achieve in general.
Recently, a work of Garg et al. [3] proposed the first candidate construction of indistinguishability obfuscators relying on multilinear graded encodings. Different variants of this construction that are secure in idealized algebraic models have been proposed in [4] , [5] , [7] , and [6] presents a construction of an iO whose security can be reduced to the assumption that semantically-secure graded encodings exist.
Paper Organization: In Section II we give a high level overview of our main techniques. In Section III we provide preliminary definitions and set up notation. In Sections IV to VI we prove Items 1 to 3 of our main theorem, respectively. In Section VII we prove that an approximate notion of iO is equivalent to the imperfect notion of iO, thus one can get similar results to Items 1 and 2 of our main theorem while assuming approximate iO.
II. OUR TECHNIQUES
We focus on Item 1 of the main theorem and present our main ideas and techniques. We say that an indistinguishability obfuscator iO is perfect if it perfectly preserves functionality (i.e., it always outputs a circuit that agrees with the input circuit on every input), and we say that iO is imperfect if it preserves functionality with overwhelming probability (i.e., with overwhelming probability it outputs a circuit that agrees with the input circuit on every input). For the exact definition we refer to Definition III. 4 . By default, we assume that an indistinguishability obfuscator is imperfect (i.e., if we require it to be perfect, we explicitly say so).
Our starting observation is that if we assume the existence of an efficient perfect indistinguishability obfuscator, then assuming that NP ⊆ io-coRP there are one-way functions, where io-coRP is the class of languages that can be coRPdecided (i.e., efficiently and probabilistically with a onesided error) for infinitely many input lengths. Given an efficient and perfect indistinguishability obfuscation scheme iO(C; x) (that uses randomness x to obfuscate an input 3CNF formula C), our candidate one-way function is defined as
where Z is a circuit of appropriate size and input length that always outputs zero. Assuming that iO satisfies both perfect functionality and indistinguishability, we show how to use an adversary A that can (infinitely-often) invert the function f with non-negligible advantage (over the choice of a random input x) in order to (one-sided, infinitelyoften) probabilistically decide the circuit (un)satisfiability of a given 3CNF formula C. This is done by simply observing whether A succeeds in inverting or not. The key observations in our argument are the following:
• If C is unsatisfiable, then by the indistinguishability of the iO scheme, A inverts f with non-negligible advantage even if we replace f (x) = iO(Z; x) with f (x) = iO(C; x).
• If C is satisfiable, then by the perfect functionality of the iO scheme, iO(Z; x) can never be a satisfiable circuit. Thus, no inverse of iO(C; x) exists and A fails to invert f when we replace f (x) = iO(Z; x) with f (x) = iO(C; x). The full proof of Observation II.1 can be found in [19] . We note that the intuition above (as well as the formal proof in [19] ) makes strong use of the perfect functionality required from iO.
Indeed, if the obfuscator is imperfect, then we cannot claim that if C is satisfiable, then iO(C; x) cannot be a circuit that always outputs zero: By the imperfect functionality of iO we are only guaranteed that for a random string x, with overwhelming probability, it will be the case that iO(C; x) is functionally equivalent to C. Therefore, for every satisfiable circuit C it is possible that there exists a string x such that iO(Z; x) is functionally equivalent to C. In this case, the inverter A can just output that x, causing us to answer incorrectly. 
A. Going Beyond Perfect iO
As we noted above, the simple construction given in Equation (1) does not work when iO is only guaranteed to be imperfect. We continue the overview by introducing a useful notation: For a circuit C we denote by C a random variable that corresponds to a random obfuscation of C. Moreover, for two circuits C and C we denote by ϕ(C, C) the set of random strings x for which iO(C; x) = C.
Observe that, with the new set of notation, the inverter A of f from above is given a circuit C and, if successful, finds an x such that x ∈ ϕ(Z, C). Thus, with high enough probability for any unsatisfiable circuit C it holds that |ϕ(Z, C)| ≥ 1, however, by the perfect functionality of iO, for any satisfiable circuit C, it holds that |ϕ(Z, C)| = 0. Hence, using A we can efficiently determine if the set ϕ(Z, C) is empty or not, that is, whether C is satisfiable or not.
Unfortunately, as we have said, when iO is imperfect this difference no longer holds. Thus, we seek for a stronger separation by ϕ of satisfiable and unsatisfiable circuits.
Towards a Strong Separation: One of our main observations (see Lemma IV.4) is that if C is a satisfiable circuit, then with high probability it holds that
At this point we wish to prove a complementary inequality (expression), that is, if C is unsatisfiable, then with high probability it holds that
If this were true, then ϕ would act as a measure that can separate satisfiable and unsatisfiable circuits. Then, we would be left proving that there exists an efficient procedure ϕ ≈ that can estimate the value of |ϕ(·, Z)|. We would decide satisfiability of a given circuit C by computing Z ← iO(Z), ϕ ≈ (C, Z) and ϕ ≈ (Z, Z), and checking whether the latter two are roughly the same or not. However, the complementary inequality (Equation (3)) does not seem to follow from the basic properties of iO. 5 Moreover, it seems hard to establish the estimator ϕ ≈ (as defined above) for reasons we will discuss later.
A Strong Separation via Double Obfuscation: Our main idea, that solves both problems raised in the previous paragraph, is to consider the double obfuscation of a circuit.
Denote by C the double obfuscation of a circuit C (i.e., C ← iO(iO(C))). By the functionality property of iO, a natural corollary of Equation (2) is that for a satisfiable circuit C with high probability it holds that
Now assume that we have an estimator ϕ ≈ that can efficiently estimate ϕ(·, Z). Unlike before, by the indistinguishability property of iO, the complementary inequality of this corollary is true! That is, if C is unsatisfiable, then with high probability it holds that
Indeed, since C is indistinguishable from Z, it must hold that any efficient algorithm that estimates |ϕ(·, Z)| is unable to distinguish between whether it was given C or Z.
At this point, we can decide satisfiability of a given circuit
, and checking whether the latter two are roughly the same or not. We are left to prove that ϕ(·, Z) can be efficiently estimated.
Towards Efficiently Estimating ϕ: We start with a standard trick for estimating the size of such sets, that was originally used by Impagliazzo and Luby [20] (see also [21] ). Recall Equation (1) which defines the function f . We append to f a description of a (pairwise independent) hash function h and its evaluation on x. That is, we define the function
where • denotes string concatenation operator and h(x)| k is the k bit long prefix of h(x). Assuming that f is not one-way, we have an efficient algorithm A that inverts f on random inputs with non-negligible probability. Using the leftover hash lemma [22] , [23] , the inverter A and the indistinguishability feature of iO, one can obtain an efficient procedure ϕ ≈ that estimates |ϕ(Z, C)| for any circuit C. Unfortunately, as we have noted, we are interested in estimating |ϕ( C, Z)| and not |ϕ(Z, C)|. A possible direction that might be useful is to try and estimate |ϕ(C, Z)|. Recall that this is not what we ultimately want, however, the following example emphasizes a step towards the final solution. To do this, consider an inverter for the function defined as follows
This direction, however, has an immediate drawback: for each circuit C, f C might have a different inverter A C , which cannot be found efficiently, thus yielding a non-uniform estimator ϕ ≈ . We remark that if we assume that deciding circuit satisfiability is hard-on-the-average, then this problem can be solved. This is true since, in this case, C is sampled at random and can be thought of as an input to the function and not part of its description, 6 which results in having only a single inverter.
Estimating ϕ via Double Obfuscation: This step can intuitively be seen as a worst-case to average-case reduction. Roughly speaking, the double obfuscation allows us to re-randomize unsatisfiable instances while maintaining the separating by ϕ, yielding a uniform estimator ϕ ≈ for the measures in Equations (4) and (5).
The idea is, as we discussed above, to obfuscate the obfuscation of Z. That is, we define the following variant of f which is our final construction:
Assuming that f is not one-way, then, there exists an inverter A for f . As opposed to the previous construction, here we have a single inverter A that can be used for any circuit C. Using similar estimation techniques as before (sampling combined with the leftover hash lemma), we are able to use A to construct an estimator ϕ ≈ that can estimate |ϕ( Z, Z)| and |ϕ( C, Z)| for satisfiable circuits C (we remark that we only require and achieve estimation in some suffice sense). For unsatisfiable circuits C, in this case, any efficient estimator for |ϕ( Z, Z)| is also a good estimator for |ϕ( C, Z)|, since C and Z are indistinguishable.
At this point, we have all the ingredients. Given a circuit C, we can use ϕ ≈ to efficiently estimate K C = |ϕ( C, Z)| and K Z = |ϕ( Z, Z)|. Using the guarantees of Equations (4) and (5) we can determine if C is satisfiable or not by the difference between K C and K Z . For the exact details and the full proof we refer to Section IV.
III. PRELIMINARIES
We start with some general notation. We denote by [n] the set of numbers {1, 2, . . . , n}. We denote by neg : N → R a function such that for every positive integer c there exists an integer N c such that for all n > N c , neg(n) < 1/n c . For two strings x ∈ {0, 1} n and y ∈ {0, 1} m we denote by x • y the string concatenation of x and y.
For a set S, we let U S denote the uniform distribution over S. For an integer m ∈ N, we let U m denote the uniform distribution over {0, 1} m , the bit-strings of length m. For a distribution or random variable X we write x ← X to denote the operation of sampling a random x according to X. For a set S, we write s ← S as shorthand for s ← U S . For a randomized algorithm A, we write Pr A [·] (resp., EA[·]) to state that the probability (resp., expectation) is over the internal randomness of the algorithm A. Finally, throughout this paper we denote by log the base 2 logarithm and we define log 0 = 0.
Throughout this paper we deal with Boolean circuits. We denote by |C| the size of a circuit C and define it as the number of wires in C. 
A. Computational Indistinguishability
where the probabilities are over X n , Y n and the internal randomness of A.
B. One-Way Functions

Definition III.2 (One-Way Functions). A function f is said to be one-way if the following two conditions hold:
1) There exists a polynomial-time algorithm A such that
2) For every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A
and all sufficiently large n,
where the probability is taken uniformly over all possible x ∈ {0, 1} n and the internal randomness of A .
Definition III.3 (Weak One-Way Functions). A function f is said to be weakly one-way if the following two conditions hold:
1) There exists a polynomial-time algorithm A such that A(x) = f (x) for every x ∈ {0, 1} * .
2) There exists a polynomial p such that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A and all sufficiently large n,
C. Obfuscation
We say that two circuits C and C are equivalent and denote it by C ≡ C if they compute the same function (i.e., ∀x : C(x) = C (x)).
Indistinguishability Obfuscation:
Definition III.4 (Perfect/Imperfect Indistinguishability Obfuscator). Let C = {C n } n∈N be a class of polynomial-size circuits, where C n is a set of circuits operating on inputs of length n. A uniform algorithm iO is called an (imperfect) indistinguishability obfuscator for the class C if it takes as input a security parameter and a circuit in C and outputs a new circuit so that following properties are satisfied: 1) (Perfect/Imperfect) Preserving Functionality:
There exists a negligible function α such that for any input length n ∈ N, any λ and any C ∈ C n it holds that Pr
where the probability is over the internal randomness of iO. If α(·) = 0, then we say that iO is perfect.
2) Polynomial Slowdown:
There exists a polynomial p(·) such that: For any input length n ∈ N, any λ and any circuit C ∈ C n it holds that iO(1
For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, any n ∈ N, any two equivalent circuits C 1 , C 2 ∈ C n of the same size and large enough λ, it holds that
We say that iO is efficient if it runs in polynomial-time.
Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation:
class of polynomial-size circuits, where C n is a set of circuits operating on inputs of length n. A uniform algorithm O is called an (imperfect) VBB obfuscator for the class C if it takes as input a security parameter and a circuit in C and outputs a new circuit so that following properties are satisfied: 1) (Perfect/Imperfect) Preserving Functionality:
where the probability is over the internal randomness of O. If α(·) = 0, then we say that O is perfect. 2) Polynomial Slowdown: There exists a polynomial p(·) such that: For any input length n ∈ N, any λ and any circuit C ∈ C n it holds that O(1 λ , C) ≤ p(|C|). 3) Virtual Black-Box:
For any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm D, any predicate π : C n → {0, 1}, any n ∈ N and any circuit C ∈ C n , there is a polynomial-size simulator S such that for large enough λ it holds that
We say that O is efficient if it runs in polynomial-time.
Notation: For ease of notation, 1 λ , the first parameter of iO and O, is sometimes omitted when it is clear from the context.
D. Leftover Hash Lemma
Definition III.6 (Statistical Distance). The statistical distance between two random variables X, Y is defined by 
The following formulation of the leftover hash lemma is taken from [24 
IV. FROM IMPERFECT iO TO ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
In this section we prove Item 1 of our main theorem and show that if an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator exists and NP ⊆ io-BPP, then one-way functions exist.
Theorem IV.1. Assume that NP ⊆ io-BPP. If there exists an efficient (even imperfect) indistinguishability obfuscator for polynomial-size circuits, then one-way functions exist.
To prove Theorem IV.1, we assume towards contradiction that there are no one-way functions (and, in particular, there are no weakly one-way functions (see e.g., [25, Theorem 2.3.2] ). Note, however, that the latter only guarantees that for every function there is an efficient inverter that succeeds on infinitely many inputs length. We use the existence of this efficient inverter to solve an NP-complete problem in probabilistic polynomial-time with two sided error. Thus, we get that an algorithm that solves the NP-complete problem infinitely-often (io), and thus NP ⊆ io-BPP contradicting our assumption. In the rest of the proof, for simplicity, we ignore this infinitely-often issue.
Let iO(1 λ , C; r) be an efficient indistinguishability obfuscator, where λ is a security parameter, C is the input circuit and r is the randomness used by the obfuscator. Let Z s,n be the canonical zero circuit of size s that accepts n inputs.
Throughout the proof, we use several parameters: λ the security parameter, n the number of input bits, s the size of the circuit and |r| the number of random bits used by the obfuscator (the latter might depend on λ and s). For simplicity of exposition, we will assume that they are all equal and denote them by n (otherwise, one could always increase the security parameter and add dummy inputs to make them equal).
Let 
Note that since iO is efficiently computable then so is f n . Suppose, towards contradiction, that F is not weakly one-way. Then, there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that can invert outputs of f n on random inputs with probability at least 1 − 1/n 50 . 7 We show that using A we are able to (probabilistically and) efficiently solve circuit satisfiability. Let f = f n .
Notation: Recall that for every two circuits C and C we define
That is, ϕ(C, C ) is the set of random strings r for which applying iO on C with randomness r leads to C . For a circuit C, we denote by C r iO(C; r) a shorthand for the obfuscation of the circuit C when applied with randomness r. Moreover, we denote by C r1,r2 = iO(iO(C; r 2 ); r 1 ) the shorthand for the (double) obfuscation of the circuit C when applied with randomness r 2 and then applied with randomness r 1 . Proof Overview: Roughly speaking, the proof follows the ideas presented in Section II. In what follows, we give an overview of these main steps and how they are used to prove our main result. Let C be a circuit. Let C be a uniform obfuscation of C and Z be a uniform obfuscation of a uniform obfuscation of the canonical zero circuit Z. Our main claims are the following: 1) Lemma IV.2 -We prove that there exists a procedure that gives a good estimation for |ϕ( C, Z)| (see Lemma IV.2 for the exact details). This result uses the assumption that f is not one-way in a very strong way. 2) Lemma IV.3 -We prove that since we can efficiently estimate |ϕ( C, Z)| (by the previous item), then it must be that case that with high probability for every unsatisfiable circuit it holds that
This is true since otherwise we get an efficient algorithm that breaks the indistinguishability feature of iO. 3) Corollary IV.5 -We prove that if C is a satisfiable circuit, then with very high probability
We emphasize that this inequality is unconditional and follows from the (possibly imperfect) functionality feature of iO. Using Items 1,2 and 3 it is easy to get an algorithm that distinguishes between a satisfiable and an unsatisfiable circuit: we compute ϕ ≈ ( C, Z) and ϕ ≈ ( Z, Z) and check if they are close or far, and answer accordingly.
The Full Proof: We begin by showing that although we cannot compute exactly |ϕ(C, C )| for any two circuits, in some cases we can approximate it quite well. Figure 1 (that gets as input C and Z) satisfies that with probability at least 1 − 1/n 10 it holds that:
where the probability is over C, Z and the internal randomness of ϕ ≈ .
The ϕ≈ Procedure
Input:
2) For k = 0 . . . n do: a) Sample uniformly at random a hash function h ∈ Hn and a random strings s of length k. The proof of Lemma IV.2 can be found in the full version [19] .
Next, we show that for every two unsatisfiable circuits Z and C with high probability |ϕ( C, Z)| and |ϕ( Z, Z)| are roughly the same. Proof: Assume towards a contradiction that the claim is false. That is, there is a polynomial q(·) such that with probability 1/q(n) it holds that | log |ϕ( C, Z)|−log |ϕ( Z, Z)|| > 400 log n.
We show that we can use the procedure ϕ ≈ from Lemma IV.2 to distinguish an obfuscation of C from an obfuscation of Z with high probability. According to the security guarantee of iO (see Item 3 of Definition III.4), the latter is a contradiction. Recall that the procedure ϕ ≈ from Lemma IV.2 is given two circuits as input: C ← iO(C) and Z ← iO(iO(Z)).
Given Z and C as in the claim, and an obfuscation of one of them W , we define a procedure Break-iO that is able to decide whether this obfuscation is an obfuscation of Z or of C with non-negligible probability. The procedure Break-iO is defined as follows: First, it samples Z ← iO(Z) and Z ← iO(iO(Z)). Then it uses ϕ ≈ to estimate K Z = ϕ ≈ ( Z, Z) and K W = ϕ ≈ ( W , Z) and output "Z if and only if these two estimates are close. The formal description of Break-iO is given in Figure 2 .
The Break-iO Procedure Input: An obfuscation W of either Z or C.
Let ϕ≈ be the procedure from Lemma IV.2. If W is an obfuscation of Z, then by Lemma IV.2 with probability 1 − 1/n 9 it holds that
1) Sample
Therefore, in this case, Break-iO will output "Z" with high probability, as required.
If W is an obfuscation of C, then by Lemma IV.2 and the assumption, with probability 1 − 1/n 9 − 1/q(n) it holds that
Therefore, in this case, Break-iO will output "C". In conclusion, Break-iO can distinguish between the obfuscations of C and Z with high probability, breaking the security guarantee of iO.
Next, we show that for every circuit C that is functionally different from the zero circuit Z, with high probability |ϕ(C, Z)| is much smaller than |ϕ(Z, Z)|.
Lemma IV.4. For any two non-equivalent circuits Z, C and for any polynomial p(·) it holds that
Proof: Let p(·) be a polynomial. Assume towards contradiction that there exists a polynomial q(·) such that
Denote by Bad the set of r's for which
By Equation (9) we have that Pr r [r ∈ Bad] ≥ 1/q(n). From the completeness of iO we have that
Denote by Bad the set of all r ∈ Bad for which Z r ≡ Z. In particular, for any r ∈ Bad it holds that |{y ∈ {0,
Clearly, this is a contradiction to the completeness of iO which proves the claim. Since for every circuit C it holds that C ← iO(C) is functionally equivalent to C with probability 1 − neg(n), we get the following corollary.
Corollary IV.5. Let C and Z be two non-equivalent circuits of the same size. Let C ← iO(C), Z ← iO(Z) and Z ← iO(iO(Z)). For any positive constant c ∈ N, with probability at least 1 − neg(n) it holds that c log n + log |ϕ( C, Z)| < log |ϕ( Z, Z)|.
A. Proof of Theorem IV.1
We prove Theorem IV.1 by showing how to combine Lemmas IV.2 and IV.3 and Corollary IV.5 in order to devise an efficient (probabilistic) algorithm SolveSAT that gets a circuit C as input and satisfies the following (infinitelyoften):
) and C ← iO(C) and uses ϕ ≈ to estimate ϕ ≈ ( Z, Z) and ϕ ≈ ( C, Z) . If the distance between the two is large, then it outputs "SAT". The formal description appears in Figure 3 .
The SolveSAT Procedure
Input: A circuit C that receives n inputs.
Let ϕ≈ be the procedure from Lemma IV.2.
1) Sample Z ← iO(Z), Z ← iO(iO(Z)) and C ← iO(C).
2) Compute KZ ← ϕ≈( Z, Z) and KC ← ϕ≈( C, Z).
3) If KZ −KC > 600 log n, output "SAT"; Otherwise, output "UNSAT". By Lemma IV.2 we know that with probability at least 1 − 1/n 10 it holds that
Assume that C is an unsatisfiable circuit. By Lemma IV.2 we get that with probability 1 − 1/n 10 it holds that
Using Lemma IV.3 we also know that with probability 1 − neg(n)
Therefore, using the triangle inequality, with probability 1 − 1/n 9 it holds that
Thus, in this case, SolveSAT outputs "UNSAT" with high probability, as required. Next, assume that C is a satisfiable circuit. Using Corollary IV.5 we know that with probability 1 − neg(n) it holds that
Using Item 2 of Lemma IV.2 we have that with probability at least 1 − 1/n 9 it holds that
Therefore, in this case, SolveSAT outputs "SAT" with high probability, as required.
V. FROM IMPERFECT iO TO ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS THROUGH SZK
In this section we prove Item 2 of our main theorem. We assume the existence of an (imperfect) indistinguishability obfuscator for 3CNF formulas. We show that assuming the existence of hard-on-the average NP problems, one-way functions exist. Theorem V.1 follows by combining Theorem V.2 with a result of Ostrovsky [15] -showing that honest-verifier statistical zero-knowledge arguments for hard-on-the average languages implies the existence of one-way functions. 8 The proof of Theorem V.2 can be found in the full version [19] .
Remark: In the proof of Theorem V.2, the only thing we require from C is that it is a "witness encryption" [13] (at least according to the definition from [14] ) of the string s. Recall that a witness encryption scheme enables one to encrypt a message m with respect to an NP-language L, an instance x and a function f , such that anyone that has, and only those that have, a witness w for x ∈ L can recover f (m, w). Therefore, we have actually shown that witness encryption for NP (even with imperfect correctness) implies statistical zero-knowledge arguments for NP.
VI. FROM IMPERFECT VBB TO ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
In this section we prove Item 3 of our main theorem. We show that the existence of efficient, even imperfect, VBB obfuscators implies (unconditionally) the existence of oneway functions.
Barak et al. [2, Lemma 3.8] proved that perfect efficient VBB obfuscators imply one-way functions. Their proof strongly relies on the assumption that O is a perfect VBB obfuscator. In the rest of this section we generalize their result and prove the following theorem.
Theorem VI.1. If an efficient, even imperfect, VBB obfuscator for point functions exists, then one-way functions exist.
The proof of Theorem VI.1 can be found in the full version [19] .
VII. FROM APPROXIMATE iO TO ONE-WAY FUNCTIONS
A natural variant of Definition III.4 is to consider approximate indistinguishability obfuscators. 9 In this variant we require from iO the second and third requirements from Definition III.4 (i.e., polynomial slowdown and indistinguishability) but replace the first requirement with the following: 1) (Approximate) Preserving Functionality:
There exists a negligible function α such that for any input length n ∈ N, any λ, any C ∈ C n and every x ∈ {0, 1} n it holds that
We observe that by standard error amplification we have that if approximate indistinguishability obfuscators exist, then imperfect indistinguishability obfuscators exist. We note that the other direction is trivial.
Lemma VII.1. If there is an approximate indistinguishability obfuscator, then there exists an imperfect indistinguishability obfuscator, and vice-versa.
As a corollary, we obtain that our main results (Theorems IV.1 and V.1) are true even if we assume the existence of approximate iO instead of imperfect iO. The proof of Lemma VII.1 can be found in the full version [19] .
